China’s Footprint in the Heart of Europe
Over the past two decades, China is no longer just an Asian economic giant. It has transformed into an aggressive global actor building networks of influence across continents. Many western observers initially saw the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as simply an infrastructure investment project focused on Central Asia and Africa. But slowly, China’s footprint began to stretch further. From the high-speed rail linking Budapest and Belgrade, to the busy port at Greece’s Piraeus, to Huawei’s 5G network trying to lay the groundwork in Eastern Europe, they bear witness to how China is bringing its influence into the heart of a region once dominated by the United States and the European Union.
The BRI was launched in 2013 by President Xi Jinping with a simple promise: connect global markets through a modern silk road. But for some geopolitical analysts, the BRI was never just about building highways or ports. It is a highly effective foreign policy instrument for expanding Beijing’s influence and creating economic dependency. If projects in Africa and Southeast Asia show the same pattern, it’s no wonder that many in Brussels are wary when this “dragon” knocks on the door of the Blue Continent.
China’s entry into Europe cannot be separated from the gap that has been wide open. The 2008 financial crisis left many Southern European countries, such as Greece and Italy, trapped under debt burdens. Fiscal difficulties and low economic growth opened up opportunities for large foreign investments. When European banks or international creditors were risk-averse, Chinese companies arrived with fresh capital and the promise of rapid development. The Port of Piraeus is a classic example. Initially only a small stake was owned by China’s state shipping company, COSCO. But in 2016, Greece, gripped by a debt crisis, handed over majority ownership to COSCO. The port has since developed into one of the main gateways for Chinese goods into Europe, and a symbol of how far Beijing’s influence has spread.
Serbia and Montenegro have also become small laboratories for the rise of BRI in Europe. When the European Union was slow to disburse infrastructure funds, China offered quick loans to build railroads, bridges and highways. Balkan countries, which have been struggling to escape post-war economic backwardness, see the BRI as a strategic opportunity. They hope the projects will spur growth and bring them closer to Western European markets. But behind the promise of investment, many fear the emergence of debt dependency that will make the foreign policies of these small countries more inclined to Beijing.
This phenomenon shows that BRI in Europe operates on two layers of logic: an economic layer that offers development and trade, and a geopolitical layer that creates political and diplomatic influence. While on the surface this appears to be a win-win cooperation, it carries the risk of internal fragmentation of the EU. As some members become more accommodating towards China, Brussels’ efforts to maintain common solidarity are complicated.
EU Strategy: Between Protection and Balancing
The European Union itself has not remained silent in the face of the rise of the BRI. The realization that China is no longer just an economic partner is driving a policy paradigm shift. In March 2019, the European Commission released a strategic document affirming a new position: China is now considered a “cooperation partner, an economic competitor and a systemic rival.” This is a very clear dividing line compared to the previous decade, when relations between the two sides were dominated by the rhetoric of win-win cooperation.
The designation of “systemic rival” is not without reason. For many European diplomats, China’s expansion through the BRI has raised fundamental questions: can Europe maintain its strategic autonomy amid growing investment and technological dependence? Is Europe resilient enough to deal with a state actor that does not hesitate to combine economic diplomacy with political influence?
In response, the European Union launched the Global Gateway in 2021. The program promises €300 billion worth of global infrastructure investment financed through a combination of public and private funds. Unlike the BRI, which is often criticized for lacking transparency, the Global Gateway emphasizes accountability, sustainability, and respect for environmental and human rights standards. In other words, the Global Gateway is a counter-narrative: Europe wants to show that development does not have to come with the risk of political dependency.
In addition to the Global Gateway, the European Union is tightening its foreign investment monitoring mechanism. Countries such as Germany, France and Italy began to be more selective in accepting acquisitions by Chinese companies, especially in strategic sectors such as renewable energy, telecommunications networks and logistics. In some cases, governments have publicly vetoed asset purchases by Chinese investors, asserting that economic sovereignty is a top priority. These measures reflect Europe’s shift from a fully open, liberal approach towards a more protective strategic realism.
But while the common policy framework has been strengthened, internal fragmentation remains the biggest challenge. Eastern European and Balkan countries continue to view the BRI as an opportunity that cannot be ignored. Hungary, for example, became the first country in the EU to sign a BRI memorandum of understanding in 2015. Viktor Orban’s government openly supports closer economic cooperation with Beijing, while criticizing what it sees as “Brussels’ hypocrisy” in valuing foreign investment. In contrast, France and Germany are more skeptical and emphasize the importance of a collective stance in dealing with China. This difference weakens Europe’s collective bargaining power, while opening up opportunities for Beijing to play a divide and rule strategy.
In terms of international relations theory, the EU’s response to the BRI reflects the tension between liberal-institutionalism and structural realism. On the one hand, Europe wants to maintain economic openness, preserve democratic values, and multilateral cooperation. But on the other hand, power calculations cannot be ignored, especially when infrastructure and technology become the new arena for the struggle for influence. The BRI proves that infrastructure is no longer just a domestic affair, but a strategic tool for expanding global influence.
For China, BRI’s success in Europe is proof that its influence is no longer limited to developing countries. Investments in Greek ports or Serbian railways demonstrate Beijing’s ability to use economic channels as an entry point for global diplomacy. As for Europe, this experience is a reminder that political sovereignty is increasingly dependent on economic resilience. The question now is whether the EU can build a credible alternative. The Global Gateway does promise many things, but the realization of its projects is still limited. If not immediately escorted by concrete implementation, this initiative will only become a rhetorical symbol that is not strong enough to stem BRI expansion. In addition, the gap between member states that are pro and contra Chinese investment also remains a stumbling block. Without a solid political consensus, Europe’s move could be trapped in reactive policies that only respond when a crisis is on the horizon.
Conclusion
Behind all these dilemmas, the European Union is being tested in its ability to maintain its role as a relevant global actor. China’s presence through BRI is a mirror that a multipolar world is no longer inevitable. Economic power, diplomacy and infrastructure are now fused into one effective strategic package. If Europe wants to maintain its position, it cannot only rely on the value narrative, but must also present a real alternative that can compete on a global scale.
The choice is clear: to be an active player with a coherent strategy or to be an arena of influence for other powers. In an increasingly dynamic global contestation, Europe’s ability to maintain internal unity while offering a more inclusive and sustainable development model will be the deciding factor whether the Blue Continent will only become a stage, or remain standing as the main actor in a new chapter of world history.
Penulis: Intan Permata Adi Putri
Mahasiswa Prodi Hubungan Internasional, Universitas Andalas
Editor: Siti Sajidah El-Zahra
Bahasa: Rahmat Al Kafi
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